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Modern machine learning systems are often trained on massive, crowdsourced datasets.
Due to the impossibility of checking this data, these systems may be susceptible to data
poisoning attacks where malicious users inject false training data in order to influence the
learned model. While recent work has focused primarily on the untargeted case, where the
attacker’s goal is to increase overall error, much less is understood about the theoretical
underpinnings of targeted data poisoning attacks. These attacks try to cause the learned
model to change its prediction on only a few targeted examples without raising suspicion. We
suggest algorithmic stability as a sufficient condition for robustness against data poisoning,
construct upper bounds on the possible effectiveness of data poisoning attacks against stable
algorithms, and propose an algorithm that provides resilience against popular classes of
attacks. Empirically, we report findings on the MNIST 1-7 image classification dataset and
the TREC 2007 spam detection dataset that confirms our theoretical findings.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In a variety of applications including image classification, autonomous driving, and spam
detection, machine learning models are used to make critical decisions. As a result, there
is an incentive for malicious actors to attack machine learning (ML) models and a need for
securing ML systems against a variety of adversary models.
Modern ML models rely on large sets of training data, which are often collected in a
public and insecure manner. It is thus easy for adversaries to add a small number of new
training points, with the goal of altering the predictions of the learned classifier. The focus
of this paper is the targeted data poisoning paradigm, where an adversary attempts to
surreptitiously cause the learned classifier to misclassify a target test point by adding a
small number of new training points.
Existing work in this area has focused on the untargeted data poisoning paradigm, where
the adversary add training points to maximize the number of total misclassifications on a
test set. In comparison, targeted attacks are provably more difficult to both detect and
mitigate. We posit that a self-interested adversary has two goals: (i) to alter the model’s
prediction on a single target example or a small subset of target points, and (ii) to evade
detection by the learner. Importantly, note that an attack which increases the overall risk on
both the targeted and untargeted test set is in fact counterproductive for such an attacker;
a model which incurs high overall test loss is likely to never make it to deployment and
therefore can never be exploited. For instance, a spammer only cares that their own few
emails successfully bypass a spam detector, but has no interest in drastically increasing the
number of other spam emails that are successfully delivered.
In this work, we propose a framework that explains why certain ML algorithms are robust
against targeted data poisoning attacks. In general, we argue that the uniform stability
property, which limits the influence of any single training example on the final model, is suf-
ficient to protect against the addition of maliciously-chosen training points. Several existing
defenses against data poisoning attacks can be interpreted as providing uniform stability of
various strengths, and we show both theoretically and empirically that robustness is cor-
related with the degree of algorithmic stability. Our key contribution is to develop a new
algorithm, called stable support vector machine (SSVM) for learning robust binary classifiers
by upper-bounding the impact that any data poisoning attack can achieve. Our algorithm
confers provable robustness properties, is efficiently trainable, and can be integrated with
popular deep learning techniques. We provide theoretical results that justify the use of
this algorithm, several approximate approaches to accelerate training and inference, and
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experimental findings on the publicly available MNIST 1-7 handwritten digit classification
and the TREC 2007 spam detection datasets. Empirical results demonstrate that SSVM
significantly reduces the efficacy of targeted data poisoning attacks when compared against
the standard SVM algorithm, and we argue that these benefits likely extend to deep neural
network architectures trained in the same way.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss attack and defense strategies that have been explored in the data
poisoning literature. Early work on poisoning attacks primarily focused on the untargeted
case and showed that a number of ML algorithms including support vector machines [1, 2],
logistic and linear regression [3], and Bayesian classifiers [4] are susceptible to untargeted
data poisoning attacks, even under the weaker adversarial label contamination model. These
attacks can cause a significant reduction in test accuracy by modifying a small proportion of
training points. Although the theoretical foundations of data poisoning attacks and defenses
can be applied to deep neural networks, most work in the area has focused on linear classifiers.
Common defenses against data poisoning attacks are filtering defenses, which use either
statistical or trained anomaly detectors to filter out training points that are likely to have
been added by an adversary. These include filtering training points that fall outside a
particular data-dependent set such as the centroid-based sphere and slab defenses [5] and
limiting the vocabulary of a language model to a pre-approved set [6]. Although data
sanitization defenses have been shown to work against a näıve adversary [5], stronger attacks
utilizing influence functions [7] and decoy parameters [8] can be successful even against
well-chosen data sanitization defenses. The latter work indicates that points chosen by an
adversary can be effective while being perceptually similar to points in the clean training
set.
Another class of defenses more similar to our line of work attempts to modify the learning
algorithms themselves. One line of work, which stems from outlier detection research, at-
tempts to mitigate the effect of points added by an adversary by only requiring the learner to
achieve low loss on an adaptively-chosen subset of the training set [9, 10]. Other approaches
include restricting the class of feasible classifiers [11] or by limiting the impact that a small
subset of training points can have on the learned classifier. The methods in this work ap-
ply similar intuition to the related concept of algorithmic stability. Methods for training
differentially private machine learning algorithms have been well-explored in the literature
[12, 13, 14]. In particular, [12] provides an algorithm for training differentially private deep
neural networks using a modified version of gradient descent that limits the impact of any
small subset of training points. We are not aware of any prior work that applies the theory
of differential privacy to the targeted data poisoning problem,
The problem of targeted data poisoning has only been explored in the past few years.
Most prior work in this area, like ours, assumes that the adversary aims to cause the learner
to misclassify a target point while not significantly increasing the generalization accuracy of
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the learned classifier. Also known as the targeted backdoor problem, attacks of this type [15]
generally require few examples and can cause a trained model to selectively fail for special test
examples. Many methods for the targeted data poisoning problem rely on a technique known
as watermarking, where a common trigger feature is added at both training and inference
time [16, 15]. Although these backdoor attacks demonstrate remarkable success rates, they
may not be applicable to some real-world ML problems where modification of the target
example at inference time is impossible. Most work that involves watermarking focus on
high-dimensional image classification problems. However, it is standard in many applications
of interest, such as natural language processing, to perform dimensionality reduction or
feature selection as a preprocessing step. It remains to be seen whether watermarking is
an effective attack against machine learning algorithms in general or just a vulnerability
of high-dimensional feature spaces. More recently, it has been shown that it is possible to
perform targeted data poisoning attacks on deep neural networks even in the clean-label
setting, where the poison points are labeled by benign human annotators and not by the
adversaries themselves [17].
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CHAPTER 3: PROBLEM SETTING
3.1 GENERAL SETTING
We consider binary classification tasks in this manuscript, though the conclusions drawn
here generalize to multi-class tasks. In standard binary classification, the learner is given a
training set Dt = {(xi, yi)}ni=1train of examples drawn from a joint data distribution P : X ×
{−1, 1} → R+ over features x ∈ X and labels y ∈ {−1, 1}, and attempts to learn a mapping
fθ : X → {−1, 1}, parameterized by θ, that minimizes the 0-1 test error L0−1(θ;Dtest) on a
fixed test set Dtest = {(xi, yi)}ni=1test drawn from the same distribution P . This test error is






I[fθ(x) 6= y] (3.1)
In order to reason about the similarity of distinct points, we assume that there exists a
metric on the domain of possible features: d : X ×X → [0,∞). The experiments performed
in this paper use the Euclidean metric on Rd for real-valued features and the cosine metric
for binary-valued features, though the theory applies more generally to other metric spaces.
A learning algorithm A : 2X×{−1,1} → (X → {−1, 1}) is a mapping from finite sets
of training examples to classifiers. Any preprocessing, filtering, or other defense steps are
implicitly subsumed into this functional. Note that we do not assume θ lies in any particular
vector space. For instance, the most concise representation of the classifiers learned by some
non-parametric algorithms is the training set itself.
We model data poisoning as a zero-sum game between the learner and an attacker, who
wants to cause the learner to misclassify a target point (xtarget, ytarget). There is no reasonable
expectation that the model’s prediction on points far from the data manifold are salient even
in the absence of adversaries. As a result, we assume that the adversary targets a point
(xtarget, ytarget) drawn randomly from P . The attacker is allowed to observe Dt, Dtest, and
knows the learning algorithm used by the learner. The attacker adds a set Dp of η arbitrary
labeled points from X to the clean training set Dt to form a poisoned training set Dc. The
learner then observes Dc and picks parameters θ̂ with the goal of minimizing the test error.





s.t. |Dp| ≤ η
θ̂ = A(Dt ∪ Dp)
(3.2)
This idealized attacker may be stronger than an attacker that a ML system might en-
counter in practice. However, a learning algorithm that is robust against this adversary will
also be robust against adversaries with incomplete information. Given that the data used to
train a classifier is often gathered from public sources, it is reasonable to imagine an attacker
who has either a similar or an identical copy of the dataset as the learner.
A natural extension of this model, which is outside the scope of this work and left for
future work, is to allow the learner to abstain instead of classifying certain points that may
be poisoned. There is an extensive literature on augmenting classifiers with an abstain option
[18, 19], and the idea of rejecting individual points is well-suited to a problem where the
adversary’s objective is to alter the prediction on only a few points.
3.2 BASELINE APPROACHES
As baseline approaches, we consider a few nonparametric learning algorithms for a metric
space (X , ‖ · ‖), and a training set Dt ∈ (X × {−1, 1})n.
The k-nearest neighbors (kNN) algorithm. For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, let Nk(x) be the set of
indices of the k nearest neighbors of x among the points in Dt. For binary classification, the




i=1 yi1[i ∈ Nk(x)] ≥ 0
−1 otherwise
(3.3)
The Nadaraya-Watson (NW) algorithm. [20, 21] Let κ : X × X → R+ be a ker-












4.1 DIFFICULTY OF THE TARGETED POISONING ATTACK
Our first set of results are concerned with the targeted data poisoning problem itself. Here
we analyze the claim that this problem is at least as difficult as the untargeted data poisoning
problem for the learner and at most as difficult as the untargeted problem for the adversary.
The difficulty of the targeted poisoning problem stems from an issue of indistinguishability:
if there exist two equally-likely clean training sets Dt and D′t which can each be augmented
with η points to form Dc, and the majority-vote classifiers for each one disagree on the target
point, then it is impossible for any learner who only observes Dc to predict the label of the
target point with certainty.
Theorem 4.1. For any poisoning budget 0 < η < n/2, there exists a domain X and
a training set Dt ⊂ X with |Dt| ≤ n labeled according to an arbitrary binary mapping
f : X → {−1, 1} such that no poison set with size η ≥ 2 can increase the loss for the
point-wise majority vote classifier by more than a small value:
max
|Dp|≤η
E(x,y)∈DtI[fθ̂(x) 6= y] = O(η/n) (4.1)
but for any target point, there exists a poison set that can guarantee misclassification by





I[fθ̂(x) 6= y] = 1 (4.2)
where for both equations, θ̂ = A(Dt ∪ Dp).
Proof. Let X = {ei}d2n/ηei=1 and let Dt include η − 1 copies of each point in X labeled by any
deterministic binary mapping.
When trying to increase the total misclassification risk over D, the adversary can only
corrupt one point, which has probability mass 1d2n/ηe = O(η/n).
However, when trying to misclassify a particular point x, the adversary can generate η
copies of (x,−f(x)). The combined dataset Dc then contans η copies of x with sign −f(x)
and η − 1 copies with sign f(x), and the majority-vote classifier labels x as −f(x). QED.
Next, we show that any algorithm that yields a provable guarantee of robustness in the
targeted data poisoning setting immediately confers the same guarantee in the untargeted
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setting. This result means that the targeted data poisoning setting is at least as difficult for
the learner as the untargeted setting.
Lemma 4.1. For all P , Dt, η, and A,
max
|Dp|≤η
E(x,y)∈DtI[fθ̂(x) 6= y] ≤ E(x,y)∼P max|Dp|≤η
I[fθ̂(x) 6= y] ≤ α. (4.3)
where θ̂ = A(Dt).
Proof. Let P ,Dt, η,A be given, and let D∗ = arg max|D|≤η I[fA(D∪Dt)(x) 6= y]. Also let
θ∗ = A(D∗ ∪Dt). Then the left-hand side of the expression can be rewritten in terms of θ∗.
max
|Dp|≤η
E(x,y)∈DtI[fθ̂(x) 6= y] = E(x,y)∈DtI[fθ∗(x) 6= y]
≤ E(x,y)∈Dt max|D|≤η I[fA(D∪Dt(x) 6= y]
(4.4)
The first inequality is true since for every training point (x, y) ∈ Dt, the set of η poisoned
points chosen specifically for x are at least as effective as points chosen for the average of all
the training points: I[fθ∗(x) 6= y] ≤ max|D|≤η I[fA(D∪Dt(x) 6= y]. QED.
4.2 UNIFORM STABILITY
We begin by studying a property of learning algorithms that has promising implications
for robustness. Many different notions of algorithmic stability have been defined in the
computational learning theory literature as tools for proving generalization bounds [22, 23].
In contrast with uniform convergence analysis, which are concerned with all functions in a
hypothesis space, stability analysis studies properties of the learning algorithm itself.
The first property that we analyze is a relatively strong assumption about a learning
algorithm known as uniform stability:
Definition 4.1 (Uniform Stability). An algorithm A has uniform stability βn w.r.t the loss
function ` if the following holds:
∀D ∈ (X × {−1, 1})n,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ‖`(fD, ·)− `(fD\i , ·)‖∞ ≤ βn (4.5)
where fD and fD\i are the classifiers learned by training on D and D\i using algorithm A,
respectively.
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Bousquet and Elisseeff [23] prove that a number of standard learning algorithms, including
SVM and ridge regression with regularization terms, satisfy uniform stability with constants
that depend on regularization strength.
Interpreting Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression and k-nearest neighbors regression as
learning algorithms, we see that both algorithms are uniformly stable with respect to the
absolute loss |f(x)− y| before thresholding. It is a standard result that the kNN prediction
is βn-stable for βn = 2/k with respect to the absolute loss.
Bousquet and Elisseeff [23] also provide a uniform stability bound for the soft-margin SVM





where kh = supx,x′∈X κ(x, x
′).
Next, we show that the Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression algorithm is also uniformly
stable with respect to the absolute loss.
Theorem 4.2. The real-valued prediction function learned by the Nadaraya-Watson kernel
regression algorithm with non-singular kernel κ : X → X → R+ is βn-uniformly stable with
respect to the absolute loss for
βn =
2kh
kh + (n− 1)k`
(4.7)
where kh = supx,x′∈X κ(x, x
′) and k` = infx,x′∈X κ(x, x
′).













j=1,j 6=i yjκ(x, xj)∑n
j=1,j 6=i κ(x, xj)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (4.8)
By symmetry of the Nadaraya-Watson algorithm with respect to the ordering and signs of
training points, we may assume wlog that the index i which attains the maximum is n and


















j=1 κ(x, xj) and zs(x,D) =
∑n−1
j=1 yjκ(x, xj). Then zs can be bounded from
both above and below, where bounds are tight when y1 = · · · = yn−1.












∣∣∣∣κ(x, xn)− z(x,D)κ(x, xn) + z(x,D) + z(x,D)z(x,D)
∣∣∣∣ (4.11)
The right-hand side of the above inequality is monotonically decreasing in z(x,D) (for z >
0) and monotonically increasing in κ(x, xn). It is easy to see that infx,D z(x,D) ≥ (n −

















κ(x, xn) + (n− 1) infx,x′∈X κ(x, x′)
≤ 2kh
kh + (n− 1)k`
(4.12)
QED.
The assumptions of Theorem 4.2 are quite mild: many kernels in common use satisfy the
non-singular property, including the Gaussian kernel κ(x, x′) = exp(−‖x−x′‖2/2σ2), Laplace
κ(x, x′) = exp(−‖x−x′‖/σ), and Epanechnikov kernel κ(x, x′) = (1−‖x−x′‖2)I[‖x−x′‖ ≤ 1].
Also, observe that the bound is tight for certain choices of discrete X .
For more realistic distributions, the bound provided by Theorem 4.2 is weak. Since the
kernel value approaches zero for pairs of arbitrarily distant points for each of these kernels,
we obtain the useless bound βn = 2 on unbounded domains. However, better guarantees
can be obtained even in the distribution-free case by restricting the domain X to a bounded
set or by choosing a kernel where
∑n
i=1 κ(x, xi) is guaranteed to be large relative to kh. The
latter idea will be developed further in the next section.
Note that the weakness of the upper bound stems from the worst-case choice of D; it
assumes that every point other than the one removed achieves the minimum kernel value
possible in X . Under some assumptions about the distribution that generates D, we may
apply average-case analysis over the randomness in sampling D (with point-wise hypothesis
stability) or over the randomness in sampling both x and D (with hypothesis stability).
One of the benefits of using uniform stability, however, is that it makes no assumptions
about the distribution that generates D. As a result, we can easily reinterpret the leave-one-
out definition of the βn-uniform stability property as a guarantee on the change of the loss
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upon adding any new point from X . Unfortunately, the application of hypothesis stability to
the targeted data poisoning problem is not as straightforward as the application of uniform
stability. Whereas the distinction between removing and adding points is inconsequential for
uniform stability, hypothesis stability does not directly apply since points in Dp are selected
deliberately and not drawn, in general, from the same distribution as Dt.
Next, we show that uniform stability confers a kind of robustness against targeted data
poisoning. Without additional assumptions, it is difficult to provide immediate guarantees
on test error. For instance, the addition of one point can cause a kNN classifier to switch
its prediction on many borderline points.
In order to relate real-valued classification outputs to the 0-1 loss, we employ the same




1 for f(x) · y ≤ 0
1− f(x) · y/γ for 0 ≤ f(x) · y ≤ γ
0 for f(x) · y ≥ γ
(4.13)
Lemma 4.2. Let fD be the predictor learned by a real-valued classification algorithm A
with uniform stability βn with respect to the absolute loss. Then for all γ > 0, and all
labeled datasets Dt and Dp with |Dt| = n and |Dp| = η,











where fDt and fDt∪Dp are the classifiers learned by training on Dt and Dt ∪ Dp using
algorithm A, respectively.
Proof. By Lemma 16 of [23], a real-valued classification algorithm A with uniform stability
β with respect to its outputs has uniform stability β/γ with respect to the loss function `γ.
For j = 1, . . . , η, let Dj be the first j elements of Dp, and let z ∈ X be an arbitrary point.
In particular, Dt = D0 and Dt ∪ Dp = Dη. Then we can express the left-hand side of the
claim as a telescoping sum using subadditivity:
‖`γ(fDt∪Dp , z)− `γ(fDt, z)‖ ≤
η∑
i=1








where the second inequality comes from applying the definition uniform stability with respect
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to `γ to each term of the summation. QED.
Lemma 4.2 translates uniform stability with respect to the absolute loss into stability with
respect to a generalization of the 0-1 loss. Without stronger assumptions, it is impossible
to provide useful guarantees about the 0-1 loss itself; even algorithms with strong stability
with respect to the absolute loss might still be vulnerable at borderline points. We see that
the impact of a set of poison points, in terms of the parameterized margin loss, is linear
in the stability constant βn and in the size η of the set. For many algorithms including
regularized networks, βn is inversely proportional to the size of the training set. Thus,
robustness improves as the size of the training set increases.
4.3 TIGHTER ANALYSIS FOR K-LOCAL ALGORITHM
Although learning algorithms with uniform stability provide some robustness against tar-
geted data poisoning attacks, we observe that these guarantees are weak for common choices
of hyperparameters and that uniformly stable algorithms like the soft-margin support vec-
tor machine can effectively be attacked in practice [1, 3, 8]. One weakness of the previous
stability analysis is that the the bounded error guarantee must hold for all datasets and
all target points in X . In practice, we do not require such strong guarantees. Recall that
in our setting, the training data and the target point are drawn from the same underlying
distribution. Furthermore, we implicitly assume that this distribution has some regularity
properties that make it possible to learn a classifier before poisoned data points are added.
The real-valued prediction of a k-local learning algorithm trained on a training set Dt at




κ(x, xi)yi1[i ∈ Nk(x)]. (4.16)
where for all i = 1, . . . , n, κ(x, xi) are nonnegative weights between x and xi. Observe
that this class of learning algorithms includes the kNN algorithm and the NW algorithm
(up to a normalization factor and for kernels that satisfy κ(x, xi) = 0 for all i 6∈ Nk(x)).
Furthermore, it includes more complicated algorithms where training points themselves are
up- or down-weighted.
We first prove that k-local learning algorithms closely approximate the conditional expec-
tation everywhere in the domain. Our proof works by bounding the distance to the k-th
neighbor for any target point x ∈ X, then defining an ideal finite-sample estimator whose
output is, in expectation, close to the output of the k-local estimator. Finally, we analyze
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the convergence of the ideal finite-sample estimator to the conditional expectation E[y|x],
which is an idealized estimator.
In addition to the existing assumptions about constraints on the learner and the attacker,
the analysis in this section assumes that Dt is drawn from a distribution whose marginal
over X has density pX , and whose conditional expectation is pY (x) = E[y|x]. We also make
some mild assumptions about the data-generating distribution.
Assumption 4.1 (Support Regularity). There exists s > 0 and r0 > 0 such that Vol(X ∩
B(x, r)) ≥ s · Vol(B(x, r)) for all x ∈ X and 0 < r < r0.
Assumption 4.2 (Lower-bounded Density). There exists a constant pX,0 > 0 such that
infx∈X pX(x) = pX,0
Assumption 4.3 (Hölder Continuity). The conditional expectation function pY is α-Hölder
continuous for 0 < α ≤ 1 if there exists a constant Cα such that for all x, x′ ∈ X , |pY (x)−
pY (x
′)| ≤ Cα‖x− x′‖α.
The first assumption ensures that the domain X appears roughly spherical in the neigh-
borhood of every x, while the second assumption ensures that a sufficiently large sample
of points is likely to cover the X well. The third assumption is generally mild for Eu-
clidean data and is a generalization of Lipschitz continuity that guarantees the conditional
expectation function changes gradually within X . We first use a high-probability bound on
rk,Dt(x) := inf{r : |B(x, r) ∩ Dt} ≥ k} from Jiang:
Lemma 4.3 ([24] Lemma 2). Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold, that points lie
in Rd, and |Dt| = n. Then if
28 · d log2(4/δ) · log n ≤ k ≤ 1
2
· γ · pDt,0 · vd · rd0 · n (4.17)






γ · pDt,0 · vd · n
)1/d
. (4.18)
Now consider an ideal estimator f ∗Dt which returns a convex combination of the condi-
tional expectations at each neighboring point, rather than a sample from the conditional




κ(x, xi)pY (xi)1[i ∈ Nk(x)] (4.19)
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Lemma 4.4. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1 and 4.2 hold, that points lie in Rd, and |Dt| = n.
Then for all x ∈ X , with probability at least 1− δ/2,
|fDt(x)− f ∗Dt(x)| ≤ kh ·
√
2k log(4/δ) (4.20)
where kh = supx,x′∈X κ(x, x
′).
Proof. Fix an arbitrary x ∈ X . Begin by grouping terms corresponding to the same training
point:




κ(x, xi) (yi − pY (xi)) 1[i ∈ Nk(x)]
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.21)
Let zi = κ(x, xi)(yi − pY (xi)). All of the zi are independent and since E[yi] = pY (xi),
E[zi] = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Var(zi) = Var(yi|xi) = κ(x, xi)2(1 − pY (xi)2). Since each
random variable zi in Nk(x) lies in an interval of size 2κ(x, xi) ≤ 2kh and is independent of
the others, we may apply Hoeffding’s inequality:





















Choosing t = kh·
√
2k log(4/δ), we see that Pr
[






Finally, we combine Lemmas 4.3, which states that the k neighbors of x are close to x, and
4.4, which states that our finite-sample estimator approximates the conditional expectation
around x well, to state a key result. The Hölder condition is required in order to bound the
amount of bias we incur by sampling neighbors near x rather than x itself. Theorem 4.3
states that in the absence of a data poisoning attack, the difference between the prediction
of a k-local learning algorithm and the conditional expectation function is bounded with
high probability.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 hold for a data set Dt with
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features in Rd and |Dt| = n. Then if
28 · d log2(4/δ) · log n ≤ k ≤ 1
2
· γ · pDt,0 · vd · rd0 · n (4.23)
for all x ∈ X , with probability at least 1− δ,
|fDt(x)− pY (x)| ≤ Cα
(
2k





Proof. The proof of this result is straightforward. We begin by adding and subtracting






and |fDt(x) − f ∗Dt(x)| ≤ kh ·
√
2k log(4/δ) hold with probability
at least 1− δ.
|fDt(x)− pY (x)| = |fDt(x)− f ∗Dt(x) + f ∗Dt(x)− pY (x)|
≤ |fDt(x)− f ∗Dt(x)|+ |f ∗Dt(x)− pY (x)|
≤ |fDt(x)− f ∗Dt(x)|+ Cα · rαk,Dt
≤ |fDt(x)− f ∗Dt(x)|+ Cα
(
2k




2k log(4/δ) + Cα
(
2k




The third line applies the definition of α-Hölder continuity, and the fourth and fifth lines
apply Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 respectively. Theorem 4.3 illustrates a few important considera-
tions when selecting hyperparameters. First, consider the choice of k. The first term on the
right-hand side in Theorem 4.3 is asymptotically decreasing in k for λk = o(k
−1/2), whereas
the second term is monotonically increasing in k. Intuitively, averaging across more neigh-
bors reduces the variance, but the labels of training points far from x may be uninformative
about x.
Another consideration is the choice of the weighting function κ. We see that the first
term of the error bound scales linearly with the largest weight among the k neighbors of
x. The variance of the estimator is minimized when κ is uniform, but the bias due to the
faraway neighbors can be mitigated by placing most of the weight on points near x. A ML
practitioner can control this tradeoff by, for instance, tuning bandwidth in kernel methods.
The choice of a small bandwidth is associated with sharply peaked values of κ, whereas a
large bandwidth is associated with nearly uniform values of κ.
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Next, we show that under some additional assumptions, the classifier learned by a k-local
learning algorithm on poisoned data agrees with a classifier learned only on clean training
data on points where the conditional expectation function is unambiguous. Let Dp ⊂ X be
a set of arbitrary examples with |Dp| = η, and Dc = Dt ∪ Dp. Also, let fDc be the (k + η)-
local predictor on Dc with the same weighting function κ. We first show that the difference
between these predictors is small with respect to the absolute loss, then show that these two
predictors agree when the conditional expectation of a point is sufficiently unambiguous.
Lemma 4.5. Assume kh = supx,x′∈X κ(x, x
′) <∞. For any x ∈ X ,
|fDc(x)− fDt(x)| ≤ ηkh. (4.26)
Proof. Let N ′k+η(x) be the set of (k + η) nearest points to x in Dc. Observe that Nk(x) ⊂
N ′k+η(x) since the order of distances to x is unchanged by the addition of new points, and
at least k points from Dt must be in N ′k+η(x). We may rewrite fDc(x) as a summation of



















The above is minimized when κ(x, x′) = kh and y
′ = −1 for all x′ ∈ N ′k+η(x) \ Nk(x) and
maximized when κ(x, x′) = kh and y
′ = 1. Since |N ′k+η(x) \ Nk(x)| = η, we get the desired
bound. QED.
Intuitively, the robustness of a certain point depends on the proportion of total voting
weight that can be secured by an adversary. The following quantity is large relative to kh








The next theorem states that for points where the absolute value of the conditional expec-
tation is sufficiently large (recall that the label of a point is ambiguous if pY (x) = 0), the
classifier trained on poisoned data must agree with the classifier trained on clean data.
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Theorem 4.4. Assume that the conditions of Theorem 4.3 hold and that |Dp| = η. Then














the signs of fDt(x) and fDc(x) match.
Proof. Let (x, y) be a random point sampled from P . Assume without loss of generality
that pY (x) > 0.
Observe that fDc(x) > 0 if fDt(x) > ηkh. We would like to establish a lower bound
on Pr[fDt(x) > ηkh]. Applying the Hölder continuity condition, for any x ∈ X and any
x′ ∈ Nk(x),
|pY (x′)− pY (x)| ≤ Cαrk,Dt(x)α (4.30)
and consequently minx′∈Nk(x) pY (x
′) ≥ pY (x) − Cαrk,Dt(x)α. For i = 1, . . . , n, let ŷi be a





κ(x, xi)ŷiI[i ∈ Nk(x)]. (4.31)
and since it is the sum of independent random variables in the range [−kh, kh], we may apply
Hoeffding’s bound. With probability 1− δ/2,
|f̂Dt(x)− E[f̂Dt(x)]| ≤ kh ·
√
2k log(4/δ) (4.32)











≥ (pY (x)− Cαrk,Dt(x)α) · κ` (4.33)









≥ ηkh + kh
√
2k log(4/δ). (4.34)
Then with probability at least 1− δ, f̂Dt(x) ≥ ηkh.
Since E[ŷi] ≤ E[yi],
Pr[fDt(x) ≥ ηkh] ≥ Pr[f̂Dt(x) ≥ ηkh] ≥ 1− δ/2. (4.35)
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γ · pDt,0 · vd · n
)1/d
(4.36)














then with probability at least 1 − δ, both fDt(x) and fDc(x) are positive. The proof for
pY (x) < 0 follows by symmetry. QED.
Observe that the required threshold for pY (x) only depends on η through the first term,
which can be interpreted as the proportion of the k neighbors that can be from the poison
set. For conditional expectation functions that contain many unambiguous points, such as
functions that satisfy Tsybakov’s low-noise condition, we may be able to guarantee that fDt
and fDc agree on a large fraction of test points. Whereas the uniform stability property
proven for the related Nadaraya-Watson algorithm in Theorem 4.2 is required to hold for
all datasets of a particular size, Theorem 4.4 provides a tighter dataset-specific guarantee.
Observe that there is still some looseness in the above guarantee.
For test points that lie in high-density regions of X , the distance to the k-th neighbor
may be lower than the one guaranteed by Lemma 4.3 and the sum of the voting weights
may be larger than κ`. For those points, it is possible to guarantee that fDt and fDc agree
using a less stringent threshold for pY (x). However, the proof of this result requires several
additional assumptions and is beyond the scope of this manuscript.
4.4 STABLE SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE
Our purpose in this section is to introduce and analyze a new learning algorithm designed
to provide robustness against targeted data poisoning attacks. The approach we take is to
attempt to improve the stability of the support vector machine learning algorithm by adding
additional linear constraints to the constrained optimization problem. We are interested
particularly with the case of k-local kernels, where κ(x, xi) > 0 if and only if xi ∈ Nk(x).
We first describe the baseline soft-margin kernel SVM [25], where κ : X × X → R. We
are concerned in particular with the case where κ(xi, xj) = φ(xi)
Tφ(xj) for some feature
transformation function φ : X → V . The maximum-margin solution to the soft-margin











s.t. ξi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n
yiw
Tφ(xi) ≥ 1− ξi, i = 1, . . . , n
(4.38)
This form of the optimization problem is known as the primal. The margin is maximized
by minimizing 1
2
wTw, and the slack variables ξi, i = 1, . . . , n represent the extent to which
the margin condition is violated for each sample (xi, yi), i = 1, . . . , n. The parameter C,
known as the regularization strength, controls the tradeoff between classification error on
the training set and margin maximization on correctly classified points.












where Q = K ◦ yyT and K is the kernel matrix, whose elements are K = κ(xi, xj).
The binary prediction of a support vector machine classifier can be represented equivalently
in terms of either the primal or the dual variables as:
fw(x) =
1 if wTφ(x) ≥ 00 otherwise or fα(x) =
1 if
∑
i αiyiκ(x, xi) ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(4.40)
Recall from Theorem 4.4 that the minimum required magnitude of the conditional expecta-
tion function is monotonic in the ratio ηkh/K`. Since the kernel value at each neighbor is
multiplied by its dual variable γ ≤ α ≤ 1 to determine voting weights, K` is nondecreasing
in γ. Thus, we are able to make stronger robustness guarantees as γ increases.
As previously noted, the soft-margin SVM algorithm achieves high accuracy on a variety
of real-world problems and supports efficient training and inference in its primal form. How-
ever, the stability of SVM depends on its regularization parameter, and achieving robustness
against targeted data poisoning attacks requires prohibitively strong regularization. In con-
trast, the kNN algorithm provides strong uniform stability but tends to perform more poorly
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in terms of accuracy on real-world problems. The stable support vector machine (SSVM)
proposed here is an example of a k-local algorithm that interpolates cleanly between these
two classical algorithms.
4.4.1 Derivation of the SSVM Problem













s.t. ξi ≥ 0, ϕi ≥ 0 ∀i
yiw
Tφ(x)i ≥ 1− ξi + ϕi ∀i
(4.41)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is an additional hyperparameter that controls the tradeoff between ex-
pressiveness and stability. Recall from Theorem 4.4 that the magnitude of the conditional
expectation required to guarantee that the clean and poisoned data agree on a point is pro-
portional to kh/κ`. By analyzing the dual of the modified SVM problem, we will show that
κ` increases as γ increases.
We next compute the dual of this modified SVM problem using the method of Lagrangian
relaxation. Adding dual variables ζ, ν, α for each of the three sets of linear constraints, we
obtain the Lagrangian














By first-order optimality, the gradients of the Lagrangian with respect to the primal
variables must be zero at the solution to the constrained optimization problem.




∇ζL(w, ξ, ϕ, ζ, ν, α) = C1− ζ − α
∇ϕL(w, ξ, ϕ, ζ, ν, α) = Cγ1− ν + α
(4.43)
Setting each of these expressions to zero, we see that minimum is unbounded unless
α = C1 − ζ and α = γC1 + ν. Eliminating the slack variables ζ and ν, we arrive at the
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From the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we observe that the prediction of the modified
SVM in terms of its dual variables is exactly the same as the standard soft-margin SVM. In
this form, it is also possible to see interesting connections between the dual SSVM problem
and existing algorithms as γ is adjusted. Two limiting cases of interest are the standard
soft-margin SVM when γ = 0 and the Nadaraya-Watson algorithm with k-local kernels.
Naturally, one would question whether or not allowing some degree of trainability sig-
nificantly improves the accuracy of the predictor learned by a ML algorithm. We answer
this question in the affirmative by providing a simple example where the kNN algorithm
misclassifies over half of the data in the training set, but the uniform kernel k-local SSVM
algorithm with an appropriately-selected γ achieves perfect training accuracy.
















1[fkNN(xi) 6= yi] ≥ 1− ε. (4.46)
where n = |D|, fSSVM is the predictor learned by the SSVM algorithm on D, and fkNN is the
predictor learned by the kNN algorithm on D.





. Place k points with label
−1 at the origin, and k−1
2
points with label 1 at a fixed distance from the origin along each
of the d axes.
The kNN algorithm on D correctly classifies all k points at the origin, since all of their
neighbors are also at the origin. For any other point, k−1
/
2 of its neighbors coincide and have
label 1, but k+1
2





points in D except for those at the origin are misclassified. The fraction of
errors is then at least 1− ε.
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Choose γ < k−1
k+1
. Then the uniform-kernel k-local SSVM algorithm with sufficiently small
regularization parameter C learns the following vector of dual variables α:
αi =
γ if xi = 01 otherwise (4.47)
For points at the origin, all k neighbors have sign −1 and the prediction must be correct.










y′ > 0 (4.48)
and they, too, are correctly classified. QED.
4.4.2 SSVM Stability
We first observe that SSVM has uniform stability properties similar to those of the soft-
margin SVM, using the analysis techniques from [23]. They provide uniform stability bounds
for linear classifiers that minimize a certain class of loss functions:
Definition 4.2 (σ-admissible [23]). A loss function ` : F × {−1, 1} is σ-admissible with
respect to F if the associated cost function c is convex with respect to its first argument and
the following condition holds
∀y1, y2 ∈ D,∀y′ ∈ {−1, 1}, |c(y1, y′)− c(y2, y′)| ≤ σ|y1, y2| (4.49)
where F is a convex subset of a linear subset and `(w, z) = c(wTx, z).
The SSVM loss
`(w, z) =
1− ywTx if ywTx < 1γ(1− ywTx) otherwise (4.50)
is 1-admissible, exactly like the standard hinge loss. The real-valued classification obtained






where kh = supx,x′∈X κ(x, x










We now try to analyze the robustness of the SSVM algorithm. Let Nk ⊂ Dt be the k
nearest neighbors of x in the clean training set, and N ′k ⊂ Dt∪Dp be the k nearest neighbors
of x in the poisoned training set. Similarly, let α be the dual variables learned by variant
SVM on clean data and α′ be be dual variables learned by variant SVM on poisoned data.
Finally, let κ and κ′ be the kernels formed by zero-masking a kernel κ̃ beyond the k-th
neighbor.



























(λi − λ′i)yiκ̃(x, si)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(4.53)
The following observations are useful in bounding this difference:
γ ≤ λi, λ′i ≤ 1 yi ∈ {−1, 1} |Nk \N ′k|, |N ′k \Nk| ≤ η (4.54)
We need to define two constants: v0 = maxx′∈X κ(x, x
′) = κ(x, x) and vk−η = minj∈Nk−η κ(x, sj).
Also observe that is, Nk−η ⊂ Nk ∩N ′k. Then since the kernel is monotonic in distance,
max
j∈Nk\N ′k
κ(x, sj) ≤ vk−η (4.55)
Splitting the absolute value, and observing that the right-hand side is maximized when
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≤ ηvk−η + ηv0︸ ︷︷ ︸
from kernel design
+ (1− γ)(k − η)v0︸ ︷︷ ︸
from training
(4.56)
This bound, like the one obtained from uniform stability analysis, shows that the impact of
the adversary scales linearly with the number of points they are able to corrupt. Assuming
that v0 and vk−η are both on the order of 1/k, we see that the robustness of this algorithm
approaches that of the kNN algorithm as γ → 1 and v0, vk−η → 1/k.
4.4.3 Gradient Descent for Solving the SSVM Problem
We now derive gradient-based methods for optimizing the SSVM objective. First, observe
that the values of the slack variables ξ and ϕ are functions of the model prediction just like
the standard SVM case.
Lemma 4.6. For every example i, either ξi = 0 or ϕi = 0.
Proof. Apply KKT conditions. By stationarity, γ ≤ α ≤ 1. By complementary slackness,
αi(1− ξi + ϕi − yiwTφ(xi)) = 0 (4.57)
which together with stationarity conditions on ξ and ϕ implies 1− ξi + ϕi − yiwTφ(xi) = 0.
Assume for sake of contradiction that w, ξ, and ϕ solve the primal problem and for some
i, ξi > 0 and ϕi > 0. There are two cases:
1. yiw
Tφ(xi) ≥ 1: By complementary slackness, ϕi ≥ ξi. Then setting ϕi, ξi ← ϕi − ξi, 0
and keeping all other variables the same, we obtain a feasible solution with lower
objective value.
2. yiw
Tφ(xi) < 1: By complementary slackness, ϕi < ξi. Then setting ϕi, ξi ← 0, ξi − ϕi
and keeping all other variables the same, we obtain a feasible solution with lower
objective value.
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In both cases, there is a contradiction; w, ξ, and ϕ cannot be the minimizer of the objective
function. QED.
Corollary 4.1.
ξi = max(1− yiwTφ(xi), 0), ϕi = max(−1 + yiwTφ(xi), 0) (4.58)
This leads to a natural gradient descent algorithm for solving the primal SSVM problem
for linear kernels. Construct a new loss function ` based on the hinge loss as follows:
`(z) = max(1− z, γ(1− z)) (4.59)










where λ > 0 controls the regularization strength. Since this problem is convex, it suffices
to show that the solution of the unconstrained problem is the same as the solution of the
primal SSVM problem.










is equivalent to minimizing the primal version of the variant linear SVM objective.
Proof. First, decompose the above loss function into a summation over examples where ξ is


































We see that this corresponds to the primal SSVM problem when λ = 1/C. QED.
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Algorithm 4.1: Stochastic Gradient Descent Method for Solving SSVM
Data: training data D, regularization parameter λ, learning rate η, feature map φ,
maximum iterations T




for t = 1..T do
Randomly select (x, y) ∈ D;
g ←
{
−γyφ(x) + λw if ywTφ(x) ≥ 1
−yφ(x) + λw otherwise
;
w ← ΠF (w − ηg) // projected gradient descent;
end
Return w
Since stochastic gradient descent on its own does not maintain the invariant γ ≤ α ≤ 1
due to the regularization term, we project the weights back onto the feasible set after each
gradient update step. Pseudocode for solving the SSVM problem using stochastic gradient
descent is provided in Algorithm 4.1.
Note that this method only works for symmetric kernels that we can represent as κ(x, x′) =
φ(x)Tφ(x′) for some feature map φ.
4.4.4 Dual Method for the k-local Kernel SSVM Problem
Since the neighbor relation is asymmetric, no feature map φ whose codomain is a Euclidean
space can, in general, preserve the neighbor relation exactly. One might then ask whether
there exists a way to apply techniques designed for symmetric positive semi-definite kernels
to this case. An intuitive approach to restoring symmetry is to make κ(x, x′) nonzero when
either x ∈ Nk(x′) or x′ ∈ Nk(x). We can define N+k (x) as the set of points for which the
chosen kernel is nonzero:
N+k (x) = Nk(x) ∪ {x
′ : x ∈ Nk(x′)} (4.63)
However, a similar construction to the one from Theorem 4.5 shows that this approach can
cause a point’s neighbors to include arbitrarily faraway points.
Theorem 4.7. For any Euclidean space Rd, any 0 < ε, and any integer k > 1, there exists
a set of points D ⊂ Rd such that
|N+k (x)| = O(d · k) (4.64)
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Additionally, maxx′∈Nk(x) ‖x− x′‖ = ε ·maxx′∈N+k (x) ‖x− x
′‖.
Proof. For i = 1, . . . , d, let ei be the i-th standard basis vector. Choose D to be a set of
points in Rd. Place one point at the origin, and k − 1 points at each ei. Also, place k − 1
points at −ε · e1. Clearly, |D| = O(d · k). The k nearest neighbors of the point at the origin
are itself and the k − 1 points at −ε · e1. However, the point at the origin is one of the k
nearest neighbors of every point in D.
max
x′∈Nk(x)
‖x− x′‖ = ε and max
x′∈N+k (x)
‖x− x′‖ = 1 (4.65)
QED.
Since the Hölder continuity assumption bounds the difference in conditional expectation
from a point x ∈ X as a function of distance to x, many of the points whose labels contribute
to the model’s prediction at x may be faraway and therefore uninformative. Perhaps more
concerning, this method of correcting for asymmetry opens up more avenues for attack by
an adversary. k-local algorithms strongly constrain the behavior of the adversary by forcing
them to insert poisoned points near the target in order impact the prediction at the target
point, but this method allows adversaries to insert any point for which the target point is a
neighbor.
For the remainder of the analysis, we will relax the conventional assumption that kernels
are symmetric and positive semi-definite, and instead define it as a selectively zero-masked
version of an existing symmetric and positive semi-definite kernel. Prior work on learn-
ing classifiers with asymmetric kernels [26, 27] shows that many properties of kernel-based
learning algorithms are preserved when asymmetric kernels are used. We call an asymmetric
kernel κ positive semi-definite iff the sum of its Gram matrix and its transpose is posi-
tive semi-definite. We will show that an asymmetric kernel (in essence, κ(x, x′) 6= κ(x′, x))
formed in this way is still positive semi-definite, and therefore that SSVM problem defined
with kernel κ is convex.
Lemma 4.7. If κ is formed by zero-masking a positive semi-definite kernel κ̃ beyond the
k-th neighbor:
κ(xi, xj) =
κ̃(xi, xj) if xj ∈ Nk(xi)0 otherwise (4.66)
then κ is positive semi-definite.
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Proof. Define related kernels κ+ and κ− as follows:
κ+(xi, xj) =
κ̃(xi, xj) if xj ∈ Nk(xi) or xi ∈ Nk(xj)0 otherwise (4.67)
κ−(xi, xj) =
κ̃(xi, xj) if xj ∈ Nk(xi) and xi ∈ Nk(xj)0 otherwise (4.68)
Since κ+ and κ− are both positive semi-definite, their Gram matrices S+ and S− are both
positive (semi-)definite. Then by Mercer’s Theorem, S + ST = S+ + S− is also positive
semi-definite. QED.
We now describe a method that optimizes the dual variables directly, and is simpler to
implement. In particular, the projection step in this method simply consists of a clipping
operation. Since the k-local asymmetric kernel is positive semi-definite, the SSVM problem
using this kernel is convex.






































where zi = yifD(xi). This leads to a stochastic dual ascent algorithm, the pseudocode for
which is provided in Algorithm 4.2. Observe that the inner loop only needs to iterate over
the neighbors of x, since κ(x, xj) = 0 for all j 6∈ Nk(x). This reduces the work per iteration
from O(n) to O(k), and this sparsity can provide significant savings in computational cost.
Additionally, there is a rich literature on fast methods for solving the SVM dual problem
that be used to further reduce the cost of the algorithm [28, 29, 30].
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Algorithm 4.2: Dual Ascent Method for Solving SSVM
Data: training data D, regularization parameter λ, learning rate η, kernel κ,
maximum iterations T
Randomly initialize α: γ ≤ αi ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n;
for t = 1..T do




for j ∈ Nk(x) do
g ←
{
−γyyjκ(x, xj) + λαj if z ≥ 1
−yyjκ(x, xj) + λαj otherwise
;






We tested our algorithms against attacks on the MNIST 1-7 image classification dataset
and the TREC 2007 spam detection dataset. Recall that the adversary in a targeted data
poisoning attack has the goal of causing the trained classifier to misclassify a specific target
point drawn from the same distribution as the training and test sets without significantly
affecting accuracy on the rest of the test set. For the sake of simplicity, the target point
in each experiment is chosen uniformly at random from the test set and we measure the
success of an adversary as the proportion of test points that it can successfully cause to be
misclassified. For both of the datasets that we consider, test accuracy in the absence of data
poisoning is over 99%, so examples that are misclassified can safely be attributed to the
impact of the adversary. We would also like to evaluate the robustness of each algorithm in
the presence of multiple independent adversaries. For each simulation, 100 adversaries are
each assigned a target point, and each one adds the same number of poisoned points to the
dataset oblivious of the others. The error rate on attacked points is then the proportion of
the 100 adversaries who are able to cause the classifier to mislabel their respective targets.
We make the weak assumption that the learner only suspects that an attack has taken
place when features of some training example lie outside the expected range. For MNIST 1-7,
this means that the brightness of each pixel is within the range [0, 1], and for TREC 2007, this
means that the bag-of-words representation is a binary vector. Real-world machine learning
pipelines may have more stringent detection methods in place [8] that further decrease an
adversary’s rate of success.
Additionally, we use the MNIST 1-7 dataset to evaluate the effectiveness of backdoor
attacks against our algorithms. Some prior work on backdoor attacks relies on generating
feature collisions between the target example and examples from a different class in the
penultimate layer of a deep neural network [17], which is clearly not relevant to many of
the algorithms being evaluated. We instead consider the Blended Injection attack method
[15], where an arbitrary fixed pattern is selected, then Dp is formed by superimposing the
pattern onto natural images. Then, the trained classifier is presented with the target example
superimposed with the pattern at inference time. For the TREC 2007 dataset, we use a bag-
of-stemmed-words representation of the body of each email, where stemming is performed
by converting the text to lowercase then truncating each word longer than five characters
at the fifth character. In order to compute distances between the resulting binary vectors,
we use the standard cosine distance. For the MNIST 1-7 dataset, we use features computed
by convolving the image with edge detectors oriented at various angles, then performing
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max pooling for dimensionality reduction. Distances between feature representations are
computed using the Euclidean distance. In order to more accurately benchmark our method
against deep learning algorithms for the TREC 2007 problem, we repeat the experiments
using features extracted by a pretrained BERT model [31]. Since pretrained embeddings
such as these are publicly available and can be audited by any interested party, we assume
that the adversary has perfect knowledge about them, but that the development of these
embeddings is safe from malicious interference by the adversary.
We evaluate five algorithms on MNIST 1-7, but only the first four on TREC 2007 due
to limited computational resources and time. Results are reported across a wide range of
hyperparameters.
k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN): A nearest neighbor classifier with uniform weights, where
the number of neighbors k per test example is a hyperparameter.
Nadaraya-Watson (NW): A k-local classifier with a Gaussian kernel whose number of
nonzero values k and bandwidth 1/σ are hyperparameters.
Adaptive Nadaraya-Watson (ANW): A k-local classifier with a Gaussian kernel whose
number of nonzero values k and the ratio r between the largest and smallest weights are
hyperparameters. The bandwidth 1/σ is adaptively chosen for each test point so the ratio
between the largest and smallest weights is always the same.
Support Vector Machine (SVM): A standard soft-margin SVM with a linear kernel,
where the regularization parameter C is a hyperparameter.
Stable Support Vector Machine (SSVM): A modified soft-margin SVM with a Gaussian
k-local kernel, where the number of nonzero values k, kernel bandwidth σ, and minimum
dual weight γ are hyperparameters.
5.1 POINT ATTACK ON MNIST 1-7
Our first set of experimental results on MNIST 1-7 are shown in Figure 5.1. We implement
the SSVM, kNN, NW, and ANW algorithms in Python, and use the LinearSVC implemen-
tation of the SVM algorithm provided by the scikit-learn machine learning library [32]. Due
to time and computation constraints, we only show SSVM results for the parameter setting
γ = 0.75. In this experiment, the adversary uses a simple strategy of inserting η = 5 copies
of the target point with the incorrect label. For the uniform kernel in the kNN algorithm
and the Gaussian kernel used in the NW, ANW algorithms, this strategy maximizes the
weights for each poison point and consequently maximizes the absolute loss at the target
point.
31
Algorithm k = 7 11 17 25 37 51
NN 100.0 10.3 10.4 2.0 0.3 0.1
NW
σ = 0.001 100.0 53.1 12.4 3.1 0.5 0.7
σ = 0.01 100.0 100.0 80.9 64.8 58.5 53.7
ANW
r = 0.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 86.9 18.8
r = 0.5 100.0 100.0 13.4 6.1 0.8 0.7
r = 0.9 100.0 10.6 13.4 0.6 0.8 0.4
SSVM
r = 0.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 73.4 16.4
r = 0.5 100.0 100.0 17.6 5.0 2.0 0.4
r = 0.9 100.0 12.6 12.4 1.0 0.4 0.4
C = 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10
SVM 0.2 0.5 3.8 33.0 89.0 100.0
Table 5.1: Point attack adversary success rates, MNIST 1-7 (%)
Our experimental results align well with the claims made earlier in the paper. All of the
k-local algorithms (kNN, NW, ANW, and SSVM) show decreasing adversary success rates
and increasing test accuracy as k increases. The NW algorithm is most robust when the
bandwidth is large and the ANW algorithm is most robust when the ratio between voting
weights is nearest 1. The kNN algorithm, which can be interpreted as the limiting case
of the NW algorithm with infinite bandwidth, achieves competitive test accuracy and high
robustness for larger values of k. We believe that the success of the kNN algorithm is due
to the low difficulty of the MNIST problem, and that other methods will be more successful
for more difficulty or noisy problems.
The SVM algorithm is also the most robust when strong regularization is used. Inter-
estingly, test accuracy and robustness are positively correlated for SVM as well. SSVM
demonstrates characteristics of both SVM and ANW, and is comparable in terms of both
robustness and accuracy to ANW for each choice of hyperparameters. Unfortunately, we
cannot draw a direct comparison between SVM and SSVM since different hyperparameters
are tested for these two algorithms.
All of the algorithms achieve > 99.5% test accuracy and < 0.5% adversary success rate
for their respective best parameters.
32
Algorithm k = 7 11 17 25 37 51
NN 89.8 73.1 36.0 6.4 1.6 1.2
NW
σ = 0.001 94.4 83.2 53.2 22.0 2.6 1.2
σ = 0.01 98.2 98.2 97.0 98.6 98.2 98.0
ANW
r = 0.1 96.8 93.0 79.8 59.0 26.0 7.6
r = 0.5 93.0 78.2 47.2 15.6 2.4 0.6
r = 0.9 91.0 74.2 32.0 6.4 2.2 1.2
SSVM
r = 0.1 92.8 86.8 75.6 47.2 20.6 4.4
r = 0.5 87.6 72.6 43.6 8.6 2.4 1.4
r = 0.9 86.4 60.2 23.8 5.0 1.6 2.0
C = 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10
SVM 76.0 100.0 99.0 100.0 100.0 99.0
Table 5.2: Blended Injection adversary success rates, MNIST 1-7 (%)
5.2 BLENDED INJECTION ATTACK ON MNIST 1-7
We also implemented and tested the Blended Injection attack [15], with results shown
in Table 5.2. Each adversary first selects a random mask, then generates η = 20 poison
points by selecting training points and superimposing the mask. Finally, it alters the target
example by superimposing the mask at the same opacity. The poison example x̃ has features
x̃ = p ·m+ (1− p) · x (5.1)
where 0 < p < 1 is the blending ratio and m is the mask. Guided by hyperparameter choices
in the original paper, which achieved the highest adversary success rates for p = 0.1 and
p = 0.2, we set p = 0.15 across all of the experiments.
In addition to test accuracy and adversary success rate metrics, we also analyzed some of
the altered target points. It appears that unlike the point attack in the previous section,
many of the poison points inserted by each adversary are not neighbors of their respective
target points. There is also an interference effect between adversaries, where points inserted
by one adversary may inadvertently be neighbors of an unrelated target point. We also
observe that the distance from altered target examples to their k-th neighbors tends to be
larger than the corresponding distances for other test points.
As before, all k-local algorithms benefit from having a large value of k. In this experiment,
the ANW algorithm outperforms the NW algorithm for each choice of k in terms of adversary
success rate. We conjecture that this may be due to the aforementioned difference in distance
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Algorithm k = 5 7 11 17 25 37
NN 81.5 1.9 0.6 0.5
NW
σ = 0.03 79.3 81.4 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.5
σ = 0.1 78.2 77.3 2.9 2.0 0.9 1.3
σ = 1 78.1 79.9 35.7 0.7 1.0
ANW
r = 0.01 80.4 78.6 79.0 74.9 75.3 72.5
r = 0.1 80.5 80.1 78.1 73.6 65.3 43.0
r = 0.5 78.9 78.7 79.5 2.8 1.2
r = 0.9 80.4 80.9 1.7 1.5 0.3 0.4
C = 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10
SVM 1.8 14.9 56.0 75.2 78.3 78.1
Table 5.3: Point attack adversary success rates, TREC 2007 with bag-of-word features (%)
to the k-th neighbor for targeted points. Since the ANW algorithm adaptively adjusts the
kernel bandwidth to guarantee a specific ratio between the largest and smallest weights, it is
better-suited to handling discrepancies in distances than the fixed-bandwidth NW algorithm.
The SVM algorithm fares far more poorly against the Blended Injection attack than k-
local methods. Only the two runs with the strongest regularization were able to limit the
adversary success rate to below 50%. Finally, we observe that the SSVM algorithm inherits
the robustness properties of the ANW algorithm, and is similarly for large k and ratios
close to 1. It also either matches or outperforms the ANW algorithm across all of the
hyperparameter choices.
5.3 POINT ATTACK ON TREC 2007
Our next set of experiments use the TREC 2007 spam detection dataset. The raw corpus
contains 75419 emails, which are annotated as either legitimate (”ham”) or spam. We
randomly split the dataset into 65419 training points and 10000 test points, and the same
split is used in all experiments. Like the analogous point attack on MNIST 1-7, each of
the 100 attackers is randomly assigned a test point and inserts η = 5 label-swapped copies
of their target. This process is repeated for 10 runs, and the reported adversary success
rates are averaged across the runs. In the absence of a data poisoning attack, a linear
SVM achieves a test error of 0.36%, which indicates that the binary bag-of-words features
constructed using the previously-described process are salient for binary classification.
Our results for the first TREC 2007 experiment with the bag-of-words representation
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Algorithm k = 5 7 11 17 25 37
NN 81.2 80.5 2.1 1.8 0.7 0.6
NW
σ = 0.03 77.7 79.0 1.9 1.2 1.1
σ = 0.1 80.0 80.7 2.4 1.9 1.4 0.6
σ = 1 78.3 34.8 2.3 1.1
ANW
r = 0.1 79.3 80.2 79.1 75.5 68.5 42.8
r = 0.5 80.4 79.5 76.1 2.3 1.0 0.9
r = 0.9 78.9 78.7 2.3 2.2 0.6 0.7
r = 0.95 79.6 79.4 2.4 1.6 0.7 0.9
C = 0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 10 100
SVM 1.1 15.9 56.2 75.7 78.1 80.2
Table 5.4: Point attack adversary success rates, TREC 2007 with BERT features (%)
are shown in Figure 5.31. We choose similar ratios for the ANW algorithm and sweep
the regularization strength C across the same range for SVM, but the range of chosen
bandwidths differs due to differences in scale between the norms of the MNIST 1-7 and
TREC 2007 features. Similar to the trends we observed on MNIST 1-7, each of the k-local
algorithms had adversary success rates that decrease almost monotonically as k increases.
The robustness of the SVM algorithm is also highest for the instances with the strongest
regularization (small C). However, the differences between adversary success rates for the
NW algorithm as the bandwidth is changed are not as dramatic as the ones we observed
for MNIST 1-7. The average test error across all of the algorithms in the presence of data
poisoning attacks is 1.1%, and no algorithm has a test error rate higher than 2.0%. Many of
the hyperparameter choices in fact have test error comparable with the test error on clean
training data.
In the second set of experiments using the TREC 2007 dataset, we use pretrained features
computed by the ”bert-base-cased” model [31] applied to a concatenated string representa-
tion of each email message. To ensure that the resulting representations are computationally
tractable, we then use average pooling to reduce the features to 768-dimensional real-valued
vectors. This experiment uses the point attack adversary strategy with η = 5 in order to
facilitate comparison against the previous set of experiments on the TREC 2007 dataset.
Results are shown in Table 5.4 and are comparable with the bag-of-words features from the
previous experiment. Just like the bag-of-words features in 5.3, many choices of hyperpa-
rameters yield classifiers with a test error rate lower than 1.0%.
1Empty cells in this and the next table were not computed due to limited time.
35
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
In this work, we analyze the properties of machine learning algorithms that confer ro-
bustness against targeted data poisoning attacks. These attacks can have dire consequences
for real-world applications, such as spam detection models, and have been shown to be re-
alizable. We suggest that uniform stability and locality are desirable properties of some
algorithms that lead to robustness, and provide evidence in the form of theoretical results
and experiments in the computer vision and natural language processing domains.
Theoretical results show that several classes of k-local algorithms, including the k-nearest
neighbor and bandwidth-limited Nadaraya-Watson algorithms, have uniform stability with
respect to the absolute loss. We connect uniform stability to limitations on the amount of
error that can be caused by a small set of added poison points and develop an algorithm that
interpolates between the stability of the Nadaraya-Watson algorithm and the expressiveness
of the SVM algorithm. Also, theoretical results show that within the class of k-local ma-
chine learning algorithms, uniformity in voting weights between neighbors leads to stronger
robustness guarantees. Experimental results on image recognition and spam detection tasks
provide further validation for our claims, and show that stable algorithms can be effective
against popular targeted data poisoning attacks that use watermarking.
There is still room for further work in this direction beyond the scope of this paper, in-
cluding rules that allow classifiers to abstain on test points that seem to be the target of
data poisoning. We also note that the SSVM algorithm may be amenable to fast, approx-
imate methods for training and inference can take advantage of its inherent sparsity. Our
work highlights the difficulty of targeted data poisoning attacks, and provides a framework
for designing robust machine learning algorithms that may lead to stronger and provable
defenses against these attacks.
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Series A (1961-2002), vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 359–372, 1964.
[22] M. Kearns and D. Ron, “Algorithmic stability and sanity-check bounds for leave-one-out
cross-validation,” Neural Computation, vol. 11, pp. 152–162, 1999.
38
[23] O. Bousquet and A. Elisseeff, “Stability and generalization,” J. Mach. Learn. Res.,
vol. 2, pp. 499–526, 2002.
[24] H. Jiang, “Non-asymptotic uniform rates of consistency for k-nn regression,” 2017.
[25] C. Cortes and V. Vapnik, “Support-vector networks,” Machine Learning, vol. 20, pp.
273–297, 2004.
[26] K. Tsuda, “Support vector classifier with asymmetric kernel functions,” in in European
Symposium on Artificial Neural Networks (ESANN, 1998, pp. 183–188.
[27] W. Wu, J. Xu, H. Li, and S. Oyama, “Asymmetric kernel learning,” Tech. Rep.
MSR-TR-2010-85, June 2010. [Online]. Available: https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/research/publication/asymmetric-kernel-learning/
[28] T. Joachims, “Training linear svms in linear time,” vol. 2006, 01 2006, pp. 217–226.
[29] J. Platt, “Sequential minimal optimization: A fast algorithm for training support vector
machines,” Microsoft Research Technical Report, 1998.
[30] T. Joachims, T. Finley, and C.-N. Yu, “Cutting-plane training of structural svms,”
Machine Learning, vol. 77, pp. 27–59, 10 2009.
[31] H. Face, “transformers,” https://github.com/huggingface/transformers, 2020.
[32] F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel, B. Thirion, O. Grisel, M. Blondel,
P. Prettenhofer, R. Weiss, V. Dubourg, J. Vanderplas, A. Passos, D. Cournapeau,
M. Brucher, M. Perrot, and E. Duchesnay, “Scikit-learn: Machine learning in Python,”
Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 12, pp. 2825–2830, 2011.
39
